Jose Cruz v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-22-2020 
Jose Cruz v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Jose Cruz v. Attorney General United States" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 407. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/407 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2020 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
 
Nos. 19-1158 & 19-2086 
 
 
JOSE OLVIN CRUZ, 
 
Petitioner 
 
v.  
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
Respondent 
      
On Petition for Review of a Final Order  
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Immigration Judge:  Nelson Vargas Padilla 
(Agency No. A200-120-477) 
 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 14, 2020 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 22, 2020) 
 
 
 
OPINION* 
 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge  
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Petitioner Jose Olvin Cruz seeks review of two decisions: (1) a Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) order reinstating a prior order of removal, and (2) a decision 
of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) affirming an asylum officer’s determination that Olvin 
Cruz did not demonstrate a reasonable fear of persecution or torture that would warrant a 
full hearing on the merits of his claims for withholding of removal or protection under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  No. 19-2086 EOIR A.R. 2, 54.1  For the reasons 
stated below, we must deny his petitions for review.   
I.  Facts and Procedural History  
A.  Background  
Olvin Cruz is a native of Honduras.  He entered the United States in 2005 and was 
apprehended at the border.  During an interview with an immigration official, Olvin Cruz 
expressed no fear of being harmed if he returned to Honduras.  He was served with an 
expedited removal order and removed to Honduras in 2005.   
Thereafter, Olvin Cruz reentered the United States on an unknown date without 
being inspected, admitted, or paroled.  In 2014, he was convicted for disorderly conduct 
stemming from a fight in the street.  No. 19-2086 DHS A.R. 30.  DHS detained Olvin 
Cruz in December 2018 and reinstated the 2005 order of removal.  He then filed a 
petition for review in No. 19-1158.   
 
1 Four records have been filed for the two consolidated cases.  In each case two 
records were filed—one each from the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“No. 
19-2086 EOIR A.R.” and “No. 19-1158 EOIR A.R.”) and from DHS (“No. 19-2086 DHS 
A.R.” and “No. 19-1158 DHS A.R.”).   
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B.  Reinstated Removal Proceedings and Reasonable Fear Interview 
On March 6, 2019, Olvin Cruz had a reasonable fear interview with an asylum 
officer, during which he expressed a fear of harm from MS-13 gang members in 
Honduras.  He stated that gang members had not threatened or harmed him but that they 
had killed three of his relatives.  In 2012, gang members killed one of his cousins as the 
cousin was leaving a bar because of jealousy over a woman.  In 2014, another cousin and 
that cousin’s father, who both worked in a mayor’s office in Honduras, were kidnapped 
and killed after they shut off the water supply for some gang members in the course of 
their employment.  Olvin Cruz stated that nobody else in his family had been harmed by 
gangs, but he believed he would be targeted if he returned to Honduras because he would 
be returning from the United States and because he was a member of a well-known 
family.  No. 19-2086 EOIR A.R. 27–38. 
The asylum officer determined that Olvin Cruz failed to establish a reasonable fear 
of persecution or torture, noting that his fear of harm was “not on account of a protected 
characteristic” and that he failed to show that gang members were inclined to kill 
members of his family on account of their membership in the particular social group 
defined as “immediate members of” his family.  No. 19-2086 EOIR A.R. 25.  He invoked 
his right to have an IJ review the asylum officer’s determination, and DHS referred the 
case to an IJ.   
Two weeks later, the IJ conducted a hearing during which Olvin Cruz testified.  At 
the close of the hearing, the IJ acknowledged Olvin Cruz’s fear of harm and found him 
credible, but concluded that he did not establish that his fear of harm was related to a 
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protected ground, specifically his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion.  The IJ acknowledged that Olvin Cruz’s relatives had 
been harmed by gang members but found that the motivation for the attacks appeared to 
stem from the relatives’ run-ins with gangs, for example over water supply, and not from 
a specific animus towards the family.  Accordingly, the IJ affirmed the asylum officer’s 
reasonable fear determination.  The IJ determined that Olvin Cruz “did not show a nexus 
or a possibility of torture” and concluded that his relatives “were not targeted” on account 
of a protected ground.  No. 19-2086 EOIR A.R. 2.  Olvin Cruz then filed a petition for 
review in No. 19-2086.  
II.  Discussion2 
We have not decided what standard of review applies to an IJ’s negative 
reasonable fear determination.3  The Ninth Circuit has held that negative reasonable fear 
 
2 We have jurisdiction to review the IJs’ reasonable fear determination under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). 
 
3 Where a petitioner whose prior removal order has been reinstated “expresses a 
fear of returning to the country of removal,” he is first screened through an interview by 
an asylum officer “to determine whether the alien has a reasonable fear of persecution or 
torture” and whether he is thus eligible for full consideration of his potential claim for 
non-return or protection against torture.  8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31(a)–(c), 241.8(e).  To 
establish a reasonable fear, the alien must show that there is a “reasonable possibility” 
that he would be persecuted or tortured in the country of removal.  8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c).  
If the asylum officer determines that the alien has a reasonable fear of persecution or 
torture, he must refer the alien to an IJ “for full consideration” of the alien’s eligibility for 
statutory withholding of removal and CAT protection.  8 C.F.R. § 208.31(e).  Those 
proceedings are then conducted “in accordance with the provisions of § 208.16” and are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the BIA and circuit courts.  8 C.F.R. § 208.31(e); see Ortiz-
Alfaro v. Holder, 694 F.3d 955, 956–59 (9th Cir. 2012).  However, if the asylum officer 
determines that the alien does not have a reasonable fear, the alien is “afforded the 
opportunity for an expeditious review of the negative screening determination by an [IJ].”  
Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478-01, 8485 (Feb. 19, 
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determinations should be reviewed for substantial evidence.  See Andrade-Garcia v. 
Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2016); cf. Telles v. Lynch, 639 F. App’x 658, 661–62 
(1st Cir. 2016) (declining to decide what standard of review applied to a reasonable fear 
determination because petitioner’s claim lacked merit under any standard of review).  
The Government argues that a reasonable fear determination is merely a threshold agency 
assessment, not equivalent to an agency decision denying an alien’s application for relief 
or protection, and that accordingly we should review the IJ’s determination under the 
deferential “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” standard first announced in 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). 
We need not decide which standard of review applies because, even if we review 
for substantial evidence, the record does not compel an outcome in Olvin Cruz’s favor.  
There is no indication that a statutorily protected ground was or would likely be a reason 
for any persecution.  See Gonzalez-Posadas v. Att’y Gen., 781 F.3d 677, 684–85 (3d Cir. 
2015); Matter of C-T-L-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 341, 346–48 (BIA 2010).  Olvin Cruz’s 
evidence reveals that his three relatives who were harmed by gang members were 
targeted based on personal disputes and not based on any familial relationship.  And a 
general fear concerning prevalent gang activity, without more, does not establish 
eligibility for withholding of removal.  See Shehu v. Att’y Gen., 482 F.3d 652, 657 (3d 
 
1999); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(f)–(g).  If the IJ reverses the asylum officer’s 
determination, he then proceeds to determine the alien’s eligibility for statutory 
withholding of removal and CAT protection, and that decision is subject to review.  8 
C.F.R. § 1208.31(g)(2).  But where, as here, the IJ “upholds the negative screening 
determination, the alien may be removed without further [administrative] review.”  64 
Fed. Reg. at 8485; 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(g)(1); Ortiz-Alfaro, 694 F.3d at 957, 959.   
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Cir. 2007) (holding that mistreatment resulting from gang’s bare desire for money is not 
persecution on account of a protected ground); Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 494–95 
(3d Cir. 2001) (holding that ordinary criminal activity is not persecution).  To the extent 
Olvin Cruz fears harm on account of his status as a returnee from the United States, those 
fears do not raise a claim for relief from removal.  See Bonilla v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 87, 
92–93 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 498 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(rejecting as “too amorphous” a proposed social group of “secularized and westernized 
Pakistanis perceived to be affiliated with the United States”)); Valdiviezo–Galdamez v. 
Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 589 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that members of a particular social 
group must “share a common, immutable characteristic that group members either cannot 
change or should not have to change because the characteristic is fundamental”).   
There is also no evidence compelling the conclusion that Olvin Cruz will be 
tortured in Honduras.  He admitted that he was never harmed or threatened by gang 
members or anyone else in Honduras, and he made no showing that he would likely be 
targeted for harm if he returns to his home country.  See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 
463, 478 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that reports of generalized brutality within a country do 
not, in the absence of additional evidence, allow an alien to sustain his burden under the 
CAT); see also Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 218 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that a 
petitioner’s “chain of assumptions” and fear regarding what might happen to him is 
insufficient to meet the more likely than not standard for CAT protection).  Thus, under 
any review standard we would affirm the IJ’s reasonable fear determination.   
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*     *    *    *    * 
Accordingly, we deny Olvin Cruz’s petition for review.  
